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Transitional path, the economic stage, equations at convergence, the years for convergence, an 
endogenous rate of technological progress, total factor productivity (TFP), three kinds of capital-
output ratios related to investment (flow) and TFP (stock), the balance of payment, budget 
deficit, saving and consumption or national disposable income (NDI), and government invest-
ment in corporation with private investment and each capital estimation.
Abstract:　According to my data-set of China 1980–2005 in Kamiryo Endogenous World 
Table (KEWT 1.07) that estimates capital stock for government and private sectors consistently 
at the macro level, China has entered into a developed country in 2002.　The years for conver-
gence in China are stil much faster than those in other developed countries.　This is realy a 
miracle.　Does this miracle continue for another several years?　My answer is suspicious.　
This paper clarifies the reasons by presenting case studies, relying on my propositions for the 
upper limit of the capital-output ratio by country setled in Kamiryo (2006b).　Developed 
countries unexceptionaly have each sufered from an upper limit of the capital-output ratio.　
This was earlier justified among countries by my data-sets for thirty countries 1995–2004 
(IARIW 2006, Joensuu).　What is needed for China to get through this inevitable dificulty 
lying at the developed stage?　How does technology and investment smoothly work together 
(under an endogenous growth model)?　Eight cases 2005–2011 in this paper assume each difer-
ent level of exports net, budget deficit, investment, and consumption.　I reveal that it is much 
more dificult for a developed country to improve the ratio of qualitative to quantitative invest-
ment than developing countries.　This is true from the equations established in my endogenous 
groth model.　At this most dificult economic stage, young China can grow steadily if invest-
ment for infrastructures is done so that a weighted average capital-output ratio of the whole 
economy is set below 2.5 and that of the private sector is set 2.0, whose level is an international 
standard under global competition.　One more policy is required: the ratio of government net 
investment to whole net investment should be maintained at less than 20% so that the ratio of 
qualitative to quantitative investment do not decline to less than 30% (as derived from a great 
misfortune Japan has entered into after 1990).
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1.　INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to simulate eight forecasting1) cases in 2005 to 2011 to under-
stand how urgent to decrease intentionaly the ratio of net investment to output towards a stable 
level, after interpreting the curent situation in China 2005, and propose urgent policies required 
for sustainable growth.　This is most important and urgent for the current global economy.　I 
have found that econometric approaches cannot reveal hidden facts the current China faces at 
today.　In my model, several current/initial values such as labor/population, consumption, 
saving, the balance of payment, budget surplus/deficit, and gross/net investment are ‘actual,’ 
and other parameters and al the variables are theoretical and endogenously measured by year 
and in the transitional path.　Policy-makers are able to change these actual values by year using 
economic, fiscal, and financial policies including tax system.　This paper concentrates on real 
assets, yet for China’s urgent recognition, I wil also numericaly clarify my indicators regarding 
the neutrality of financial assets, refering to the theoretical rate of inflation and the central bank 
interest rate.2)
The current China is already at inexperienced crisis in that the current interest rate by the 
central bank is too low to prevent inflation and assets-inflation and if China could have a higher 
interest rate to recover the neutrality of financial assets the exchange rate wil be much stronger 
than the curent level, which in turn accelerates the income diference.　Another problem in the 
curent China is that the curent saving rate is extremely too high and this must be absorbed by 
both the ratio of net investment to output/income and the balanced of payment.　China is weak 
at shifting investment to consumption, without which China wil fal into a severe depression.　
The above crisis lies as the background of China economy.　And, eight cases cannot be set in 
this paper apart from the crisis and risky circumstances.　Nevertheless, in eight cases I assume 
that each case wil happen as the results of urgent policies towards the reform of the tax system, 
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 1) This expression of ‘forecasting’ is the terminology in econometrics.　My model difers from econo-
metrics, whose diferences I clarified in Kamiryo (2008a); see a brief summary of these diferences 
in Appendix at the end.　In the transitional path of my model, ex-ante equals ex-post value by a 
period of time.　This value coresponds with ‘forecasting’ value in econometrics (for example, see 
Oulton, Nicholas (2007).
 2) For simplicity, this paper does not step into the analysis of the assets-inflation (for comparison, see 
Kamiryo (2007e).　The theoretical rate of inflation is inherently related to assets-inflation or the 
valuation ratio as valuation value at convergence to capital stock.
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infrastructure investment, and social policies to low income people.
For the last fifty years, the US has supported the world economy by presenting steady con-
sumption that represents the demand-side.　The current China is at the supply-side and China 
exists due to the existence of a shock absorber of the US.　According to my model and data-set 
of China 1980–2005, China has entered into one of developed countries after 2002, which is 
reflected by key ratios in my model.　Why is China one of developed countries after 2002?　
Typicaly, the capital-output ratio defined as capital divided by national disposable income 
(NDI 3)) in China was 1.9576 in 2001, 2.0523 in 2002, and 2.1630 in 2005.　In Kamiryo 
(2006b) that prepared for my data-sets of thirty countries by sector 1995 to 2004, I found that 
if a country’ capital-output ratio is more than 2.0, this country deserved to be a developed 
country.　It is dificult for an economy to overide this level of 2.0 and it is further dificult for 
the economy to try to keep the level of less than 2.5, due to expanding government investment 
and budget deficit.
What is an essential reason for a developed country to slow down its growth?　A develop-
ing country enters into a developed country supported by continuous high levels of investment 
with improving technology.　Assume that this country continues to invest at a high level of 
30% to NDI.　Wil the corresponding capital-output ratio soon become beyond 3.0?　This is 
impossible by a fact that any country’s capital-output ratio of the private sector (the whole/total 
economy less the government sector) has to stay at around 2.0 due to global competition.　Nev-
ertheless, the government sector’s capital-output ratio is free from global competition and apt to 
rise if budget deficit is beyond a limit.　In this sense, the EU deficit rule of 3 % (to GDP) is 
appropriate in that this guideline prevents a country’s capital-output from a rise to more than 
2.5 (to NDI).　For example, in Japan, due to huge public capital investment and deficit, the 
capital-output ratio is 3.6655 in 2005, where the capita-output ratio of the government sector is 
8.0 while that of the private sector stays at 2.0 due to severe global competition.　Right now, 
apart from the neutrality of financial assets, China wel controls budget deficit whose level is 
moderate and supports the activities of the private sector, where government capital-output ratio 
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 3) I use NDI to distinguish it with GDP.　In KEWT 1.06, it is dificult to obtain net primary income 
from abroad by country in the original IMF data.　Therefore, I actualy use disposable income that 
excludes net primary income from abroad.　In this case, saving is domestic.　Also, I do not treat 
direct investment in financial accounts.　However, this amount is extremely high in China 
compared with other countries such as India.　It may be beter to revise the capital-output ratio by 
taking into accounts this amount yet, I do not treat this problem.　Instead, I point out that the 
capital-output in China is undervalued in the real world.
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is 2.1847 in 2005.
Yet, if China continues to invest a huge amount to public investment for infrastructures 
and if the ratio of deficit to NDI continues to rises, both wil soon oppress the growth rate 
significantly.　China’s private sector wil not raise its capital-output ratio beyond the current 
level of 2.1573 due to global competition.　These facts imply that China requires a strong 
control of the capital-output ratio or more simply the share of government output to total output 
(based on disposable income) must be less than a certain level (from a large government to a 
smaler government4)).　In other words, China must improve the level of technology or total 
factor productivity (TFP) more urgently since TFP is inversely involved in the capital-output 
ratio as in my model.　I stress in this paper that I have not found the literature to present 
essential determinants to control the capital-output ratio, except for my model that integrates the 
government and private sectors using the ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative 
investment.　How to conquer the dificulties inherent in the economic stage?　This wil be my 
contribution in this paper.　More in general, any economy needs to smoothly transition from a 
developing to a developed economy by using efective policies to investment and technology.　
And eight cases in this paper wil present both good and bad investments and each corespond-
ing technology at the balance between the government and private sectors, inspecting the 
relationship between the capital-output ratio and the ratio of qualitative investment to quantita-
tive investment.　If China is successful in maintaining sustainable growth or in urgently 
conquering inflation and lowering a high saving rate, China wil happen to be the second case 
(after the US) in the world economy to support and guarantee the world robust economy in the 
future.
Section 2 wil summarize my model and methods.　This section presents a base for 
estimating my data-set of China 1980–2005.　Section 3 wil clarify the characteristics of key 
ratios in China 1980–2005, comparing with those in the US, 1960–2005.　My model and meth-
ods step by step completed by Kamiryo (2004a, 2005b, 2006a) so that I do not explain the 
detail and I use, as a base, the ratios of the whole/total economy.5)　For the amounts and ratios 
of China 1980–2005, see Tables A-3 and A-4 in Appendix.　Section 4 presents eight cases 
and shows good and bad results for 2011.　These results wil indicate useful limits for eco-
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 4) Kamiryo (2007b) derived the equal relationship between government output and total taxes, stating 
with Dornbusch, Rudiger (1980).
 5) I have used ‘total’ instead of ‘whole’ in my data-sets.　China national accounts use ‘the whole 
economy.’　In my data-sets, when data are expressed using amounts, the whole/total economy = 
government sector + private sector holds.
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nomic and fiscal policies.　I raise research questions in detail: Does China continue high 
growth after 2005?　Or, does China not fal into a bubble economy after 2005?　What comes 
after high speed economy in China?　For example, the years for convergence are 15 years in 
2005 while the curent developed countries are more than 50 years.　What stops economic stag-
nation, slowdown, or bad times as developed countries have sufered unexceptionaly (e.g., after 
1973 in Angus Maddison (1983))?　What results do effective urgent policies bring about?　
My replies to the above research questions wil be the core of this paper and wil suggest new 
methodology to sustainable growth in a developed economy.　Cases A to D start with ratios 
and Cases E to H start with amounts, where you wil check the balance between the whole econ-
omy, the government sector, and the private sector, by inspecting the relationship among the 
capital-output ratios of the whole/total, government, and private sectors.　And, Section 5 shows 
conclusions.
2.　MY MODEL AND METHODS
2.1 Brief summary of my model and methods
In this section, I wil first explain the outline of my model and methods.　I wil arrange 
my equations used for China’s transitional path at the current situation, 1980–2005, and for 
eight case studies, 2005–2011.
My methods are based on an endogenous growth model that connects the equations at con-
vergence (in equilibrium) with the Cobb-Douglas production function and bypass production 
functions.　In my methods, the data necessary for the model and methods are simultaneously 
estimated and analyzed at the macro-level.　Kamiryo (2006b) already folowed the methods, 
using thirty country data-sets of the government and private sectors and the total economy as 
the sum of the two sectors.　Also, Kamiryo (2006a, 2006b) strengthened my methods, extend-
ing my equations for conditional convergence and the years for convergence and clarifying 
empirical results.　My methods difer from the literature such as shown by Bart van Ark and 
Nicholas Crafts (1996) and Robert Baro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995, 2004).　My methods 
use the equations at convergence that endogenously measures variables such as the rate of tech-
nological progress, the growth rates of output and per capita output and several others, by using 
the initial/current parameters obtained from my data-sets by country and by sector.　The equi-
librium supposed in these equations, if these equations are used for the private sector, corre-
sponds with the market equilibrium that is needed for the estimation of capital stock and the rate 
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of return aggregated at the micro-level as shown by Dale Jorgenson (1963, 1966) and Dale 
Jorgensen and Zvi Griliches (1967).
The purpose of this paper is to confirm the current China’s economic stage and show a 
robust direction to sustainable growth required as a developed country.　In this respect, the con-
tents of Kamiryo (2006b) are useful to this paper.　China has passed the barier from a develop-
ing to a developed country.　However, the transition after this barrier is dificult to operate 
without a bright lighthouse.　This is because, in general, capital increases easily but technology 
does not progress in paralel with the increase in capital stock.
My data-set by country satisfies the ex-post equilibrium between the supply-side and the 
demand-side by taking into consideration the balance of payment and budget surplus/deficit, as 
stressed by Khaled Hussein and Anthony Thirlwal (2000) and Anthony Thirlwal (2002).　My 
data-set supplies capital stock by country and by sector at the macro-level based on national 
disposable income (NDI) instead of GDP.　Estimation of capital stock is justified in two ways. 
First, I reply on a modified relationship between returns/rents and consumption at the macro-
level, using national taste by country.　Second, I reply on a consistent relationship between the 
capital-labor ratio and capital stock, using the ratio of the rate of return to the wage rate,6) (r/w), 
that is related to the central bank interest rate and CPI.
My equations start with those at convergence in the transitional path.　At convergence, 
variables are measured using the curent parameters by country and by year.　In the transitional 
path, the current situation by country always reaches convergence as shown by Charles I.　
Jones (2002).　This transitional path needs, in my model, two specified parameters: (1) beta as 
the ratio of quantitative investment to the sum of quantitative and qualitative investments, b, or 
the ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investment of   .　(2) delta as a 
parameter to control the transitional path from diminishing returns (DRC) to capital to constant 
returns to capital (CRC).　At the curent situation, delta exists to express DRC indispensable in 
the Cobb-Douglas production function.　This delta reduces to alpha that is the relative share of 
capital or returns/rents.　In my transitional path, alpha is fixed and the capital-output ratio and 
the rate of return (i.e., the ratio of rents to capital) converge to those at convergence each as a 
variable parameter.　For this convergence, I prepare for the convergence coeficient of lambda; 
B ≡ −( ) /1 β β
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 6) The wage rate and the rate of return in my model are theoretical (not actual) based on the labor func-
tion of consumption.　Thus, the theoretical rate of inflation is the diference between the growth 
rate of per capita output and that of the wage rate, which is, for the government decision-making, 
compared with actual/estimated CPI by year.
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the years for convergence are 1.0 divided by lambda:   .
7)　And, I calculate each discount 
rate of beta and delta, per annum during the years for convergence.　By using these discount 
rates in recursive programming, beta reaches beta* and delta reaches alpha at convergence.　
The measurement of “the years for convergence” was established similarly to Sala-i-Martin 
(1991a, b).　However, my years for convergence that use an endogenous rate of technological 
progress are much shorter than those that use an exogenous model as in Sala-i-Martin (1991a, 
b).　The years for convergence clarify the characteristics of convergence by country.　The 
characteristics of convergence are determined by four ratios; the ratio of investment to 
output/NDI, the ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investment, delta, and the capital-
output ratio.　The related equations wil be summarized in Session 3.　Also as used in the case 
studies in Session 4, the years for convergence over years (not at a point of time) clarify the 
change of economic stages.　These years for convergence clarify what economic policies are 
most important at a specified stage of an economy.
2.2　Equations in the transitional path
This section aranges equations I use in Sections 3 and 4, where I analyze the curent situa-
tion in China 2005 and present case studies for 2005–2011 by diferent investment and technol-
ogy policies.　I divide my equations in the transitional path into two parts: (1) equations at 
convergence and at the current situation and (2) equations at the flow level and the stock level.　
These equations are derived in detail in Kamiryo (2006a, 2006b).　In this paper, I omit each 
process to derive these equations and concentrate on empirical researches with regards to the 
essence of how to make China successfuly transit to a robust developed country.
The equations measure and manipulate beta, delta and the years for convergence, 1/lambda.　
Without these measurements, my endogenous does not complete and I cannot have a good com-
mand of my data and absorb the data into the Cobb-Douglas production function.　The equa-
tions fundamentaly make it possible to justify the use of the Cobb-Douglas production function 
in cooperation with national accounts.　For example, the relative share of rents or capital in the 
transitional path is fixed and as a result the rate of technological progress measured at the cur-
1/λ
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 7) The idea first appears in Sala-i-Martin (1990a, b).　My lambda folows this idea, but under an 
endogenous growth rate and with delta which is introduced as a parameter that neutralizes diminish-
ing returns to capital towards convergence in the transitional path.　Baro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
discuss this issue with ilustrations in the transitional path.　And, Javier Andres, Rafael Doménech 
and César Molinas (1996) extended and measured lambda diferently with implicit alpha yet under 
an exogenous growth.
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rent investment is equal to the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP).8)　And, the rela-
tive share of rents or capital in the shift of the production function varies by year and as a result, 
the rate of technological progress and the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) difer by 
year.　The relative share of rents or capital, alpha, used in the literature cannot prove these 
results.　For example, al the textbooks roughly use 30% of the relative share of profit/returns, 
based on GDP (that includes capital consumption).　This issue is traced back to a true relation-
ship between consumption and returns, which is only revealed by using NDI.
For equations at the flow level and those at the stock level, I indicate that the investment or 
saving as the flow level seems to be consistent with the Cobb-Douglas production function, yet 
investment and the production function are originaly independent.　Robert Solow (1956) estab-
lished a best-cited model yet, under an exogenous model and without presenting a method to 
distinguish the flow level with the stock level.　The production function holds at the stock 
level: capital, labor, and TFP are al at the stock level.　Investment is at the flow level.　The 
relationship between the flow level and the stock level is solved only by using delta and by 
distinguishing TFP, the ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investment (B), and the 
capital-output ratio at the stock level with those at the flow level.　In particular, the product of 
B and the capital-output ratio is 1.0 under a specified condition at the stock level.　However, in 
this case, the Cobb-Douglas production function turns to a Ak model.9)　Nevertheless, the Ak 
model, stil being an endogenous growth model, is in paralel with the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function.　By avoiding a confusion of the stock level with the flow level, two forms of the 
capital-output ratio are revealed.　This finding presents a key for distinguishing one country 
with other countries in the economic stage.　This is because the capital-output ratio is essen-
tialy related to TFP (or the level of technology) and the ratio of qualitative investment to quanti-
tative investment.　In this respect, the comparison of the equations at the stock and flow levels 
is atractive.　Accordingly, the control of the rate of technological progress (gA at the flow 
level) and the growth rate of TFP (gTFP at the stock level) presents a key to robust sustainable 
growth in China that is just entering into a developed country.
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 8) In this case the elasticity of substitution, sigma, is 1.0.　I wil discuss it in detail in Kamiryo 
(2008a).
 9) The Ak model seems to be similar to but difers from the AK model discussed by Khaled Hussein 
and Anthony P. Thirlwal.　Nevertheless, my finding of the above bypass production function 
suggests that the diference between two schools is not so diferent.
Towards China’s Successful Soft Landing: Eight Case Studies 2005–2011, Compared with Matured Economies
The equations to measure essential equations:
These equations uses four curent/initial parameters: (1) the ratio of net investment to NDI, 
i, the relative share of capital, alpha, the growth rate of population, n, and the capital-output 
ratio, W(0), assuming that W(0) is equal to the capital-output ratio at convergence, W*.　These 
equations show variables and parameters such as an endogenous growth rate and the year for 
convergence that uses the endogenous growth rate.　These equations are also applied to each of 
government and private sectors (see Table A-5 with notations in Appendix).
For the relationship between b* & b and the capital-output ratio:
 (1)   ,  ,at convergence.
   at the curent situation.
 (2)   ,where, endogenously,  .
 (3)   ,where
  holds under a = constant by year under recursive programming using the Cobb-
Douglas production function.　In the case of the shift of a production function, the a after the 
shift shows a diferent value from the a before the shift:  holds by year.
For the growth rate of per capita output:
 (4)   ,where  .
   .10)
   .
Each for the growth rate of output and the rate of return (or the ratio of rents to capital) at 
convergence:
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10) Charles I.　Jones (2002, pp. 39–43) explains Solow’s model plainly using the efective labor and 
defining a state variable as   or   ,where   and   .　
When an exogenous rate of technological progress, g, is introduced into transition dynamics, the 
value of g is directly connected with the growth rate of per worker capital, gk.　This g is defined as 
the growth rate that is needed for maintaining a constant level of per worker capital similarly to the 
growth rate of population/employed persons.　The diference between s・y and  (after 
depreciation) shows the increase in  .　At convergence,  ,in Solow’s model.
 k K AL≡ /  k k A≡ / A TFP= −^ ( /( ))1 1 α g g gk A= =
( )n g k+ 
k k = 0
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The relationship between the growth rate of output and the rate of return (or the ratio of 
rents to capital) at convergence:
 (6)   or  .
The convergence coeficient, l, is formulated as,
 (7)   ,
11)
where an endogenous rate of technological progress is given by   in my model.　
The years for convergence are given by,
 (8)   .
Using the years for convergence, the discount rates of beta and delta are obtained:
 (9)   .
(10)　  .
I assume that both discount rates are used even after convergence in my model.
(11)   at the flow level, where,
endogenously,  holds.
Next, the discount rates of (r/w) is shown similarly to Eqs. 9 and 10 (as an example with-
out using e = 2.7182818),
(12)   ,
(13)   ,
where an underlying relationship is  as an accounting identity.
Note that under recursive programming, k* is only obtained at t = 1/l by using 
  by year.　The discount rate of convergence in (r/w), 
  ,is obtained similarly to the discount rates of   and   .　The 
diferences of   and   respectively determine each year’s value of b(t) and 
d(t) in recursive programming by using the years for convergence, 1/l.　Furthermore, in the 
case of k(t), both values of k* and (r/w)* are unknown while in the cases of beta and delta, these 
values at convergence are measured separately using each equation.　It is dificult to obtain k* 
because  is shown at convergence.
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11) In both Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Javier Andres, Rafael Doménech and César Molinas 
(1996), the convergence coeficient, lambda, is expressed as  under an exoge-
nous growth and including the depreciation rate of d.　Here, my model is net (after depreciation) 
and, my delta is a parameter to neutralize DRC and difers from the depreciation rate.　Neverthe-
less, both equations have a similarity, apart from endogenous versus exogenous.　I am thankful to 
Dr. Toshimi Fujimoto for his help to specify lambda.
λ α ϕ δ= − + +( )( )1 n
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3.　CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INVESTMENT TO OUTPUT AND 
THE CAPITAL-OUTOUT RATIO
3.1 The ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investments, the ratio of investment to 
output, and the capital-output ratio
This section clarifies the most fundamental relationship between technological progress, 
the ratio of investment to output, and the capital-output ratio.　Physical (fixed asset) investment 
is quantitative and apt to increase.　This is an essence of investment and capital stock.　My 
model divides investment into qualitative and quantitative investments.　Qualitative investment 
is human-oriented and responsible for technological progress.　Quantitative investment is physi-
cal and turns to fixed asset investment.　Indispensable characteristics of investment are that 
quantitative investment is apt to increase exponentialy and qualitative investment does not 
increase in paralel unless top management and economic policies continuously push its 
enhancement.　In the world global economies, no regulation and perfect market under severe 
competition inspire qualitative investment to some extent.　Yet, some countries stil fal into 
divergence that implies that economies fail to grow without entering into developing countries 
(e.g., see Eastern and Southern Europe by Bart van Ark (pp. 271–326, 1996).
This is traced to a commonly accepted fact that economic growth increases if the ratio of 
investment to output, i, increases regardless of whether or not its contents difer.　I prove it 
using Eq.(11),   ,where if i increases the rate of technological 
progress increase assuming that the second term of the RHS of the equation remain fixed.　
However, an invisible fact is hidden in this equation.　If i increases, the ratio of qualitative 
investment to total investment, beta, increase.　Accordingly, the ratio of qualitative investment 
to quantitative investment, B, decreases.　This implies that the capital-output ratio, W, 
increases (in detail, see  in Article 2, Appendix, where the TFP 
as a final residual is expressed by   ).　In other words, the capital-output ratio is 
tightly related to technology.　The capital-output ratio increases as i increases quite easily.　
Economists cal this stage such that a country gets into a developing country.　Nevertheless, 
some countries cannot continue to make i higher and remain divergence countries.　My model 
reveals the reasons why one country gets into a developing country while the other country 
cannot.　Moreover, a developing country cannot always get into a developed country under 
convergence.　My model also reveals the reasons why one country gets into a developed 
g t i t k tA
t( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( )= − −1 β α δ
1 0. ( ) ( )( ) ( )= ⋅B t tTFP FINAL TFP FINALΩ
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country while the other country cannot.　I wil now explain these reasons using related 
equations.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between   and i (upper figure) and the relationship 
between  and  ,where  .　Figure 2 shows the values of both the elasticity of 
  w.r.t. i and the elasticity of   w.r.t.   ,using China, Japan, and the US, each 2005.　
These characteristics are summarized:
1. The higher the i, higher the .　However, when the range of i is between just above zero 
and 10%, the value of  increases (aggravates) sharply.　After this range of i, the value 
of   increases slightly as i increases.　This is suggestive when we set case studies for 
China in 2005 to 2011.　It is meaningless to maintain the level of i high as before.　
Rather such a high level of 30% to NDI raises the capital-output ratio and this wil soon 
stop a high level of economic growth.
2. The higher the  , higher the   .　However, when the range of   is between just 
above 0.5 and 1.5, the value of  decreases (improves) sharply.　After this range of  ,
the value of   decreases slowly (asymptoticaly) as   increases.　This is suggestive 
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Figure 1 The elasticity of the ratio of qualitative to quantitative investment at convergence, 
B0
*, with respect to the ratio of net investment to output, i; with its base
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when we find that China’s  is already above 2.0.　China has been successful to enter-
ing into a developed country yet, China from now on must conquer the dificulties al the 
developed countries have suffered.　More efforts to raise the value of   is required 
under B’s asymptotical curve to .
3. In the top of Figure 2, Japan’s elasticity of  w.r.t. i (  ) is sharpest.　The US’s elas-
ticity of   w.r.t. i is most modest.　And, China’s elasticity of B w.r.t. i is intermediate.　
The case of Japan is exceptional since its budget deficit extremely higher than that of other 
countries.　China’s case shows that China is geting into a developed country.
4. In the botom of Figure 2, three countries show similar trends of the elasticity of  w.r.t. 
 .　This elasticity hits a botom at = 1.5 or so and, after = 2.0 the elas-
ticity has an asymptotical upward curve.　 = 1.0 implies that a constant relationship 
Ω*
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*
Ω*
B0
* η
B i0
* /
B0
*
B0
*
Ω Ω
*
/
( )* *ηB0 Ω* Ω*
η
B0
* */Ω
―　　―35
Figure 2 The elasticity of the ratio of qualitative to quantitative investment, B0
*, with respect 
to the capital-output ratio, W*; with its base at convergence
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between   and   exists.　China shows  > 1.0 at about  = 2.0.　Japan and 
the US show  > 1.0 at about  = 4.0.　As a result, China is younger than Japan 
and the US: China improves a specified (corresponding with the current capital-output 
ratio at the flow level) ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investment at the flow 
level,  ,more easily than Japan and the US.
3.2 The ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investments, and the capital-output ratio 
in the transitional path
Next, in the transitional path, I wil show the characteristics of the ratios of qualitative 
investment to quantitative investment, distinguishing the flow level and the stock levels and 
comparing China and the US, together with growth rates and the years for convergence.　Also, 
I wil show the characteristics of the coresponding capital-output ratios, distinguishing the flow 
level and the stock levels and comparing China with the US.
Figure 3 (in detail, see Appendix) shows, for China 2005 in the transitional path, (1) basic 
growth rates, gTFP(t), gk(t), gy(t), and the rate of return, r(t), (2) four kinds of the ratios of quali-
tative investment to quantitative investment, Bs, in transitional path; B0(t) as the flow level, 
  ,  ,and   ,each as the stock level, and 
(3) four kinds of the capital-output ratios;   ,  ,  ,and 
  ,each corresponding the above four Bs.　For the stock levels, I prefer 
 to  and   .　  is 
similar to  ,and  is too low in order to express IRS in its produc-
tion function.　It is interesting to compare   at the flow level with   at 
the stock level.　  and   have a point of intersection just before the 
years for convergence.　At this point, embodiment and disembodiment are equal at the macro-
level.　The issue of embodiment started with the micro-level in the literature yet, I prove 
that the issue of embodiment also holds at the macro-level and is expressed by using   
and   .　Generaly,   starts at a value lower than the value of 
  and this trend is reversed after convergence if delta(t) given at the current 
situation stil continues after convergence.　I suggest that it is useful for the two diferent 
approaches (i.e., the macro-level based approach of Kamiryo and the micro-level based 
approach of Jorgenson) to clarify the results of embodiment and disembodiment in the transi-
tional path.　China 2005 in the transitional path is young as shown in Figure 3.　Figure 3 is 
compared with Figure 4 that shows the same items using the US 2005.
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Figure 3 The growth rates, the ratios of qualitative to quantitative investment, and the 
capital-output ratios: in the transitional path, China 2005
Hideyuki Kamiryo
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Figure 4 The growth rates, the ratios of qualitative to quantitative investment, and the 
capital-output ratios: in the transitional path, the US 2005
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What are diferences between Figures 3 and 4?　What brings about these diferences?　
These diferences come from the diference of the years for convergence.　The years for con-
vergence of China 2005 are 15 years while those of the US are 55 years.　The faster the years 
for convergence are, the more vivid the above rates and ratios after convergence.　Let me com-
pare the relationship between  and  that are based on the TFP 
as a final residual.　This relationship of China 2005 is more dynamic than that of the US 2005. 
The slower the years for convergence the less diminishing returns to capital (DRC) or closer to 
constant returns to capital (CRC) (as seen in Japan 2005).　Due to China’s fast years for con-
vergence, China enjoys a short period DRC and a long period IRC after convergence.　Theo-
retical values are given at convergence.　Yet, the transitional path shows both before and after 
convergence and clarifies the whole power.
Finaly, I summarize the character of the capital-output ratio.　Its change in the transi-
tional path is considerably slow compared with the ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative 
investment.　And, it is interesting to compare  at the flow level with  at the 
stock level.　Both curves gradualy approach the same curve after convergence when the Cobb-
Douglas production function at the current situation shows DRC.　Exceptionaly, when the 
Cobb-Douglas production function at the current situation shows IRC due to a minus growth 
rate of population (as in Russia), both curves start with the same curve and, after convergence 
both curves move to each diferent direction.　Usualy, the capital-output ratio is unique in that 
there is no difference between the flow level and the stock level after convergence.　This 
implies that we do not need to pay too much atention to the diference of the capital-output 
ratios of the flow and stock levels at the curent situation.
4.　CASE STUDIES FOR CHINA’S SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, 
2005–2011: IN THE TRANSITION FROM A DEVELOPING to 
DEVELOPED ECONOMY
4.1 The data, 1980–2005, and its implication as a preparation of case studies
This section first explains the data of China, 1980–2005, and second shows the contents of 
data arrangement.　The data is consistent with my endogenous growth model and the Cobb-
Douglas production function, where the level of technology or total factor productivity (TFP) at 
the stock level is calculated, together with an endogenous rate of technological progress at the 
flow level.　In the next section, I wil briefly state the implication of China economy in the 
B tTFP FINAL( , : ) ( )1 1− −δ α ΩTFP FINAL t( ) ( )
Ω0 ( )t ΩTFP FINAL t( ) ( )
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long-run.　I wil specify real facts in these twenty-five years.　For comparison, I wil show the 
current key results of Japan, the US, the UK, and Sweden in 2005 in Figures A-1 and A-2 in 
Appendix.
For the data, I use China Statistical Yearbook 2006 as a base.　There are some diferences 
between the data of China Statistical Yearbooks and the data of International Financial Statistics 
Yearbooks, IMF.　For the recent data in 2003 to 2005, I obtained basic data from National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, Beijing,12) to confirm such up-dated data as exports (net), budget 
deficit, and net fixed capital formation.　I do not clarify the detail of the government sector in 
this paper, yet I wil calculate the capital-output ratios of the government and private sector as 
a clue to the relationship between private and government investment.　My data-set of China, 
1980–2005, are shown in Tables A-3 and A-4 in Appendix, where analytical results are 
derived by combining my equations with my methods for estimating returns/rents and capital 
stock.　The notations are shown in Table A-5 in Appendix.
In the data-set of China 1980–2005, I estimated capital stock.　My model does not hold 
without modifying returns/rents and estimating capital.　However, in the literature, capital 
stock at the micro-level wil usualy be aggregated using Jorgenson’s formula (supported by the 
perpetual inventory method (PIM), OECD formula, and/or others.　I indicate that the compari-
son of diferent values is useful to clarify the relationship between macro-data with micro-data.　
My estimation of capital stock is significantly macro-oriented.　For justification, I indicate that 
it is dificult in the long-periods (40 to 50 years) for such items as capital investment, capital 
consumption (depreciation), capital retirement, capital stock, and aggregated items from the 
macro-level to be always consistent with such macro-data as the balance of payment, budget 
deficit, consumption, saving, and NDI.　In the short-period (less than ten years), it is less difi-
cult for the data aggregated at the micro-level to be consistent with the macro-data.　I under-
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12) China Statistical Yearbook (CSY) 2006 publishes al the data-source which I need for my data-
arrangement.　The original data of China I need for my model are: (1)population (L), exports, net 
(BOP),budget deficit (SG-IG), gross capital increase (DK(GROSS) ), depreciation (Dep), consumption 
(C), the central bank interest rate (rCB), CPI or its rate of increase(gCPI), government 
consumption(CG), and government net capital increase (D KG(NET) ).　These data are al available in 
CSY after 1994.　However, I had to estimate CG and D KG(NET) in 1980–1993, based on smooth 
trends of government NDIG (= CG + SG) and YG/Y.　For example, the value of YG/Y is 75% in 1980 
and 20% in 2005.　The purpose of my inquiry to Dr. Xianchun Xu and Zhen Sun in Dec 2006 was 
to confirm up-dated amounts of the exports, net (as BOP), budget deficit, and gross investment for 
2003 to 2005, where I found the diferences of amounts between CSY and IFSY, IMF.　For this 
paper I used CSY 2006 as a base.　I am responsible for my final arangement of data, i.e., data-set 
of China 1980–2005.
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stand why PWT after 6.1 stopped the publication of the capital-labor ratio (or, capital stock by 
multiplying labor) after 1996.　The capital-output ratio derived at the macro-level, as have esti-
mated, may be more theoretical or consistent with macro-data and difers from the capital-
output ratio derived by aggregating micro-data.　In detail, I wil discuss this problem in another 
paper for IARIW, Slovenia 2008.　In the case of China, there is no capital stock estimated and 
published officialy.　I estimated China capital stock for the periods of twenty-five years 
(1980–2005) consistently using my method at the macro-level.　As a result, stock and flow 
values by year are consistent with each other in 1980–2005.
Second, I wil briefly summarize the arrangement of my data-set of China 1980–2005 as 
folows:
1. Direct data from statistics: Labor that uses population, L, with its growth rate n, net exports 
defined as the balance of payment, (S–I), budget surplus/deficit as (SG – IG), net investment 
as gross fixed asset formation or gross investment less depreciation, INET, and consumption, 
C.
2. As a result, saving, S, and national disposable income as output in my model, Y = NDI, are 
each calculated.　When I use net investment of the government sector, the saving of the 
government sector is also obtained, as I showed in Kamiryo (2006b) that divided the total 
economy into the government and private sectors.　I stress that a good example of the 
whole economy is not always good if the capital-output ratios of the government and 
private sectors are not balanced or difer too much.　As a bad case, if the deficit divided 
by NDI is above 3%, it begins to oppress a whole economy’s growth and I proved its role 
in Kamiryo (2006b).
3. One external value and the other internal/endogenous value in my model: (1) the value of 
(rho/r) that shows national taste and (2) the value of (r/w) that determines the capital-
output ratio consistently, where rho is the discount rate of consumption which difers from 
r as the theoretical rate of return used for capital, returns, wages, and output/NDI.　Modi-
fied wages per capita is w = W/L.　(rho/r) and (r/w) are each used separately in two 
equations: for wages,  or  and for capital, . 
I stress here that national taste and the labor function of consumption in the long-run con-
sistently equalize the change in the quality of each capital and labor at the micro-level. 
In this respect, Angus Maddison (1996, pp. 56–57, p. 62) summarizes the essence of 
growth accounts.　Adopting Edward Denison’s (1967) growth accounts, Maddison plainly 
explains why growth accounts need to estimate and use each quality of capital and labor.　
( )( )1−α c 1− =α c rho r/( / ) k r w= −α α/( ) /( / )1
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In my approach, by estimating capital and returns/rents,13) I maintain consistency between 
data.　Instead of Maddison’s approach, I atach importance to the labor function of con-
sumption, where the total factor productivity as a final residual is the ratio of qualitative 
net investment to quantitative net investment,  .　The changes in each 
quality of capital and labor are absorbed into .　As a base, I estimated 
this function successfuly for China 1980–2005.　This is a clear parabolic equation: 
  with its variance R2 = 1.00 (see Figure 5).　I 
found that this equation14) worked consistently in my macro data of China.　I wil apply 
this equation to the case studies for 2005–2011, China.　Note that government saving is 
equal to its rents or returns according to an accounting identity, where (rho/r) =1.0.
4. Supplementary data in statistics: The market rate or the central bank discount rate, rCB, and 
consumer’s price index, CPI (together with its growth rate, gCPI), that are available in 
B tTFP FINAL( , : ) ( )1 1− −δ α
B tTFP FINAL( , : ) ( )1 1− −δ α
( / ) . . .rho r c c= − +1 8075 2 2549 1 46882
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13) Capital estimation at micro-level or the use of (after depreciation) is usualy appropri-
ate if the periods are within ten years or so.　However, if the periods are thirty to forty years (e.g., 
1960 to 2005),   and   do not consistently cooperate each other.　
I guess that this is a reason why PWT 6.1, 6.5 and after, do not publish the capital-labor ratio (or, 
capital stock).
14) I got this equation using the data in 1993–2005.　I found that another equation that used the data in 
1980–2005 did not fit wel for the estimation of capital stock in 1980–2005.　A reason is maybe 
the system change from National Product System to the United Nation’s System of National 
Acounts, 1993.
K K K1 0= + Δ
K K K1 0= + Δ k r w= −α α/( ) /( / )1
Note: This function is shown as (rho/r) = 13.301c^2 – 22.608 + 10.566 in the case of the 
US 1960–2005 and (rho/r) = 1.4672*c^2 – 0.9273c + 0.6983 in the case of Japan 
1960–2005 (Kamiryo, 2007b).
Figure 5 The function of consumption in China 1980–2005
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IFSY, IMF.
5. Supplementary data in my model:  .　  is the actual rate of 
technological progress that is derived from the current net investment and expressed 
as  .　  is the growth rate of total factor 
productivity (TFP) as a stock and is expressed as  .　
  is directly related to (rho/r) and alpha by year in the economic stage. 
If  = 1, alpha remains constant over years.　In the current China 
(after 2001),  is more than 1.0 in 2002 to 2004.15)　This case implies 
that technology improves more significantly by the current investment than by accumu-
lated TFP (i.e., more embodied than before).
6. Consistency between   and  : If the labor function of 
consumption or (rho/r) is roughly estimated,   does not work consis-
tently with   in the long periods.　For shorter periods, the relationship 
between   and   usualy does work wel.
16)　Note that 
(rho/r), (r/w),  , and alpha are tightly related each other and if the 
value of  shows too abnormal, some data must be inappropriate.　The 
elasticity of substitution reflects the change in alpha and useful to the adjustment of 
  (for discussion, see Kamiryo (2007ed)).　In the transitional path, 
these relationships are simple since alpha is constant over years.　In the economic stage, 
by adjusting both  and the elasticity of substitution, alternative policies 
to adopt are strongly suggested: R&D does not always work for the technological progress.
4.2　The data, 1980–2005, implication as a preparation of case studies
First I wil specify China’s economy during the last twenty-five years and then I wil 
summarize the implication of the current China economy in 2005.　I assert that China started 
with an uncertain stage, entered into a developing country in 1996, and promptly got into a 
g gA FLOW TFP STOCK( ) ( )/ gA FLOW( )
g g gA actualFLOW y actual k actual( ) ( ) ( )= − ⋅α gTFP STOCK( )
g TFP TFP TFPTFP = −( ) /1 0 0
g gA FLOW TFP STOCK( ) ( )/
g gA FLOW TFP STOCK( ) ( )/
g gA FLOW TFP STOCK( ) ( )/
1− =α c rho r/( / ) k r w= −α α/( ) /( / )1
k r w= −α α/( ) /( / )1
K K K1 0 1= + Δ
k r w= −α α/( ) /( / )1 K K K1 0 1= + Δ
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15) The actual (FLOW) rate of technological progress,  ,was shown first by Peter 
A. Diamond (1965, Eq. 8, p.290) in terms of the elasticity of substitution and later empiricaly by 
Chang-Tai Hsieh (1999, p.134). This is exactly equal to   in the transi-
tional path.　In my model, I prove that the above equation holds under both CRS and IRS.　When 
the production function shifts, alpha changes and in this case,  roughly holds.
16) There is no inconsistency in the case of China.　Inconsistency between k = K/L and  
is solved by adjusting net investment, assuming that gross investment has been correct for many 
years.　When the capital-output ratio of the government sector shows a minus value, it implies that 
its rate of return should be minus instead of the capital-output ratio.
g g gA w r= − + ⋅( )1 α α
g g g gTFP A FLOW y k= = − ⋅( ) α
g g gA w r= − + ⋅( )1 α α
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developed country in 2002.　It is rare for a backward country to get out of an uncertain stage or 
a poor country.　China got successfuly through its dificulties of longer poor and faster devel-
oping stages, with continuous high rates of both saving and investment.　Already after 2002, 
China has been one of developed countries according to my research.　I stress here that if a 
country’s capital-output ratio at the macro-level is above 2.0, it implies, this level belongs to a 
developed country, apart from the level of inequality.　In Kamiryo (2006b) I tested economic 
stages by country, using my thirty country data-sets 1995–2004 and comparing ten developed 
countries.17)　This paper for China does not include region analysis yet, if the capital-output 
ratio is above 2.0 in the whole economy, the capital-output ratios each in four Direct City 
regions might have shown 2.0 before 2002.　In short, China changed significantly and surpris-
ingly, leaving the problems of inequality, resources, and environment.　This is a reason why 
some people are doubt about China in the future.　My case studies wil positively reply this 
doubt to some extent (focusing on the sustainable growth rate).
Figure 6 shows the transitions of (1) exports (net), as the balance of payment (BOP) in the 
narrow sense, budget surplus/deficit, and the ratio of saving to NDI, and (2) per capita NDI, y 
= Y/L,18) and per capita wages, w = W/L, China 1980–2005.　Many countries have failed in con-
troling budget, resulting in unstable economic growth.　In this respect, China is out of dificul-
ties by controling budget deficit within a sound range except for 2001–2003.　The trends of y 
and w justify that China surprisingly entered into a developing country in 1996 and a developed 
country in 2002.　Now China is at a cross point since y and w must be adjusted, facing at an 
upper limit of the capital-output ratio.　Figure 7 shows the transition of (1) the rate of return, 
r, alpha, and the ratio of net investment to NDI, i, (2) the capital-output ratio, qualitative invest-
ment to quantitative investment at convergence, B*, and the ratio of net investment to saving, q 
= I/S, and (3) the growth rate of TFP, the rates of technological progress at both the curent and 
at convergence, gA and gA
*.　Both B* and gA
* for 1980–2005 have declined, and gradualy 
approached the levels of developed countries.　These trends are roughly shown using the 
capital-output ratio, W = K/Y.　Figure 7 indicates that China must promptly prepare for success-
ful landing into a steady growth.
Second, I wil summarize the curent situation of China 2005 and also what should be done 
for the future in China.　I have provided my data-set by country in 1960–2005 in another 
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17) My method in 2002 was not complete at that time.　I partialy analyzed thirty-one regions of China 
by region, including four special regions such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing.
18) In my model, output is always shown by NDI, where NDI = Y.　For example, alpha = P/NDI.
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paper19) and here digesting these results, I wil set China 2005 as a starting year towards 2011.　
Several developed countries had had high ratios of net investment to NDI, i.e., 25 to 35%, for 
ten to twenty years.　In this respect, a high level of 30% to NDI in recent China is not 
surprising.　In my data-set, I start with reliable data of the BOP and budget deficit to obtain a 
base between saving and net investment.　And the sum of the BOP is zero in the world yet, the 
sum of budget deficits has increased in the world, which is a serious problem.　In particular, 
many developed countries have sufered from huge budget deficits and ofset economic growth. 
Then, if budget deficit is moderate, is sustainable growth guaranteed?　No, sound budget is one 
of determinants of sustainable growth.　I find that the continuous high investment is necessary 
for the developing stage but this destroys the future of the developed stage.　This is because a 
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Figure 6 BOP, budget deficit, saving/NDI, per capita NDI, and the wage rate: China 1980–2005
19) “Inconsistency between macro-data and micro-data: by using my data-set by country in 
1960–2005.” This paper is in progress and wil be submited to IARIW, Slovenia 2008.
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Figure 7 Net investment/NDI, alpha, the capital-output ratio, the ratio of qualitative invest-
ment to quantitative investment at convergence, B*, and the rates of tech. progress 
at current and at convergence: China, 1980–2005
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high net investment raises the capital-output ratio, which in turn lowers technological progress 
or the ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investment (see Session 3 above).　In other 
words, a high growth inevitably leads to a low growth.　This constitutes the character of the 
developed stage.　If economic and fiscal policies are poor, the results are much miserable.　
Sustainable growth is a goal of economic and fiscal policies.　Yet, many poor countries fail to 
get into the developing stage and most developing countries respectively fail to maintain a 
robust growth at the developed stage.　This comes fundamentaly from a weakness of methods.
Now in China, as seen in Figure 6, China is at the border to sustainable growth.　Some 
may forecast that China inevitably gets into bubble and sufers from its recovery as most devel-
oped countries have experienced.　Conclusively speaking, China has controled budget deficit 
within an alowance level: there seems to be no problem in budget deficit.　And for the BOP, 
my case studies use the amounts of Yuan BOP principaly published by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China Yearbook.　If I used both published amounts of saving in the whole econ-
omy and published US$ BOP, the changes in the exchange rate wil be clarified.　In my case 
studies, for simplicity, I calculated saving using the Yuan BOP.　How can China smoothly land 
at a sustainable growth within several years?　This is my objective in eight case studies.　This 
wil need a cooperation balanced between the government and private sector, even if the whole 
economy seems to be sound.　Now I wil present case studies to sustainable growth.
4.3　Eight case studies for 2005 to 2011
This section discusses eight cases of China national accounts, 2005–2011.　These wil 
reply to my research questions raised in introduction.
These research questions are: Is China enjoying high growth after 2005?　Or, does China 
not fal into a bubble economy after 2005?　What comes after high speed economy in China?　
What stops a possibility of bad times such as developed countries have suffered from 
unexceptionaly?　What results do efective urgent policies bring about?　Also I confirm here 
that China has conquered dificulties to reach a developed country and, an urgent issue is how 
to maintain sustainable growth avoiding a shock economy.　Angus Maddison (1987) investi-
gated why growth and slowdown occur in advanced capitalist economies using his growth 
accounts and comparing shares of net capital income in the literature, but without using the 
capital-output ratio.　For productivity convergence, Edward Wolf (1991, pp. 575–577) is one 
of rare papers that measures the capital-output ratio that covers several curent developed coun-
tries in 1870 to 1979.　Wolf uses average age, gross capital stock (before depreciation), and 
―　　―47
Hideyuki Kamiryo
GDP, whose capital-output ratio fals almost between 2.0 to 2.5 among these countries.　My 
capital-output ratio uses net capital stock and NDI, which may correspond with the capital-
output ratio estimated by Wolf, by assuming that NDI/GDP and Net/Gross capital are ofset.　
Conclusively, Wolf suggests that the capital-output does not override a certain level for many 
years.　The stylized facts of Nicholas Kaldor (1978) and Charles Jones (2002) already showed 
the constancy of the capital-output ratio.
For eight cases, I wil divide my case studies into two parts that start with “ratios” for 
Cases A to D and “amounts” for Cases E to H.　These cases principaly discuss the whole econ-
omy using exports (net), and budget deficit.　These cases, accordingly, do not directly clarify 
the relationship between the government sector and the private sector.20)　The capital-output 
ratio of the whole economy is a weighted average of that of the government sector and that of 
the private sector.　However, assume that the capital-output ratio of the government sector is 
too high as in Japan.　In this case, the capital-output ratio of the private sector, WPRI, must be 
less than 2.0, which does not guarantee moderate growth in international competition.　There-
fore, it is important for each case to guarantee WPRI = 2.0 at the private sector.　Assuming WPRI 
= 2.0, I manipulate government investment or the ratio of net investment to NDI of the govern-
ment sector.　Infrastructure is essential for the private sector, households, and the whole econ-
omy, yet if fiscal policy to government investment is inappropriate typicaly as in Japan, the 
whole economy never leads to robust.　I stress in this section that without balanced cooperation 
of the government and private sectors, the whole economy cannot maintain sustainable growth.　
Thus, at the botom of each case, I clarify the relationship between the government and private 
sectors by indicating each capital-output ratio as a result of the changes in the rates of increase 
in each deficit, investment, and consumption of the government sector.　For confirmation, this 
paper starts with the whole economy and then, clarifies the key ratios of the government and pri-
vate sectors.　This approach difers from that in Kamiryo (2006b) that estimated the govern-
ment and private sectors separately and aggregated the two sectors to the whole economy.
For Cases A to D, I wil begin with BOP/NDI and consumption/NDI under given technol-
ogy (see soon below).　For technology, Cases A to D assume each in advance the level of the 
ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investment at convergence, B*.　This assumption 
is justified by the resulting changes in the capital-output ratio that are calculated using the given 
B*.　For Cases E-H, I wil begin with “amounts” of net investment, saving, and consumption.　
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Kamiryo (2006b, 2007d).
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In these cases, the ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investment is adversely 
calculated.　In this respect, Cases A to D difer from Cases E to H, yet the same equations are 
used diferently.
It is now urgent for China not to repeat the same faults as developed countries have 
experienced.　In eight cases, most important relationships are the capital-output ratio at conver-
gence, B*, or the ratio of qualitative investment to the sum of qualitative and quantitative invest-
ment,  , delta, and the years for convergence.　In particular, the years for 
convergence are a sensitive indicator to the transition of economic growth stages.　For nota-
tion, I use output Y or NDI, where Y = NDI in my model.　Let me summarize each case and 
conclusive suggestions among each four cases:
Cases A to D:
In Case A as a base to Cases B to D, I set three ‘ratios’ for 2005–2011: (1) the ratio of net 
investment to saving, , (2) the ratio of consumption to NDI, c, and (3) the ratio of quali-
tative investment to total investment at convergence, beta*.　As a base, I need a sound transi-
tion of the BOP, which is related to  , where  .　For Cases B-D, I set 
three ratios for 2005–2011: (1) the ratio of net investment to NDI, i, (2) the ratio of consump-
tion to NDI, c, and (3) the ratio of qualitative investment to total investment at convergence, 
beta*.
The ratio of BOP to NDI was 4.19% in 1997 and 4.14% in 1998.　In other years, it lies 
between 2% to 3% after 1990 except for –2.26% in 1993.　Therefore, 5.44% in 2005 is consid-
erably high compared with other years after 1990.　Case studies, however, start with 2005 and 
I have to start with BOP/NDI = 5.44% in 2005.
Case A shows BOP/NDI = 1.25% in 2011 from 5.44% in 2005 when beta* or B* remains 
unchanged while the ratio of consumption to NDI rises arithmeticaly to 75% in 2011 from 
63.06% in 2005.　This is an ideal transition for six years ahead.　I set yearly conditions difer-
ently in Cases B to D.　In Case B, the ratio of consumption to NDI increases by 2% and the 
ratio of net investment to NDI decreases by 0%, while beta* aggravates by 2%; each per annum. 
As a result, the results of growth rates are the third among the four cases, but BOP/NDI turns to 
–2.56% and the actual growth rates also turns to a minus values.　In Case B, B* = 0.2048 in 
2011, which may be a litle low as a goal.
In Case C, the ratio of consumption to NDI increases by 2% and the ratio of net investment 
to NDI decreases by 2%, each per annum, while beta* remains unchanged.　As a result, the 
results of growth rates are the second among the four cases.　BOP/NDI is 1.08% in 2011 and 
β * */( )= +1 1 B
θ = i s/
θ = i s/ θ = +i BOP i/( )
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the actual growth rate of per capita NDI slightly decreased; 11.11% in 2011.　In Case C, beta* 
= 0.737 or B* = 0.3568 in 2011, which may be dificult to atain.　In Case D, the ratio of con-
sumption to NDI increases by 3% and the ratio of net investment to NDI decreases by –5%, 
while beta* aggravates by 2%; each per annum.　As a result, the results of growth rates are the 
worst among the four cases.　BOP/NDI is 1.54% in 2011 but, the actual growth rate of per cap-
ita NDI is –15.2% and its rate at convergence is 2.94% in 2011.　In Case D, B* = 0.1363, 
which is too low (no competitive at al).　For two typical transitions of the capital-output ratio, 
see Figure 8.
Moreover, in the above cases, the years for convergence difer each significantly.　The 
years for convergence in Case A turns to 16.93 years in 2011 from 14.91 years in 2005.　The 
―　　―50
Figure 8　Cases C and D in planned transition in China 2005 to 2011
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years of convergence in Cases B, C, and D turn to 19.03, 14.98, and 33.22 years; each in 2011. 
These results show that the years for convergence increase when China advances in the eco-
nomic stage.　For example, the years for convergence of the US 2005 are 54.62 years and 
exceptionaly, those of Japan 2005 are 239.48 years due to too huge budget deficit compared 
with NDI (see Figure 9).
I wil now review the above cases by using the relationship between the capital-output 
ratio of the government sector and that of the private sector.　When the capital-output ratio 
becomes close to 2.0, the private sector is stil competitive according to my research that uses 
thirty country data-sets 1995–2004 and developed country data-sets 1960–2005.　In developing 
countries, it is conspicuously required to provide infrastructures for the private sector and to 
induce atractive investment.　However, the supply of infrastructures comes from government 
investment at the sacrifice of budget deficit.　Thus, it is important for the government to check 
a sound limit of government investment.　For example, in the case of Japan, government invest-
ment had been so excessive that budget deficits had increased tremendously.　As a result, the 
curent private sector has to be conservative to investment: this is spiritualy crowing-out.　This 
phenomenon is clarified using the data-set of Japan 1960–2005.
―　　―51
Figure 9　The years for convergence: China, the US, and Japan
Source: Kamiryo (2007b)
Note: The years for convergence is given by 1/l = 1/((1 - a)n*(1 - d)g* A, where alpha is the 
relative share of return, n is the growth rate of population, delta is a parameter that neutral-
ize diminishing returns, and g* A is an endogenous rate of technological progress.　Abnormal-
ity of Japan is traced back to huge budget deficit and the extremely high capital-output ratio 
of the government sector.
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Lastly, I assert that the weighted average of the capita-output of the two sectors roughly 
fals in 2.5 and that a sound limit of the capital-output ratio in the private sector is 2.0.　Then, 
using the actual NDI share of the government sector in China is 20%, an upper limit of the 
capital-output ratio in the government sector wil be 4.5:   using 
 .
21)
Using the above logic, I interpret Cases A to D each by each as folows:
1. In Case A, the NDI share of the government sector decreases to 13.44% in 2011.　This is 
too conservative when the government wants to ofer more infrastructures.
2. In Case B, the NDI share of the government sector is 34.46% in 2011.　This is too active 
or bold.　As a result, the capital-output ratio of the whole economy is 4.0077 and that of 
the government sector is 7.8262 in 2011.　This case is a copy of the curent Japan.
3. In Case C, the NDI share of the government sector is 21.75% in 2011.　This is roughly 
within alowance.　This is the best case among Casa A to D.　The reason is that the ratio 
of qualitative to quantitative investment remains unchanged as an assumption.
4. In Case D, the NDI share of the government sector is 53.42% in 2011.　This is a 
government-oriented economy as in the early 1980s.　The capital-output ratio of the 
whole economy is 5.7114 in 2011.　The capital-output ratio of the government sector is 
8.9472.　This is rather a lesson towards poor countries.
In short, these cases indicate how important it is for China to maintain a high ratio of quali-
tative investment to quantitative investment, B*, by balancing the capital-output ratio of the gov-
ernment with that of the private sector.　In the real world, it is next to impossible for an 
economy to maintain B* unchanged (compare Case B with Case D at the opposite side).　It is 
true that developed countries decrease B*.　Furthermore, it is inevitable for developed countries 
to decrease the ratio of net investment to NDI and increase the ratio of consumption to NDI over 
years in the long-term.　I wil show these characteristics in the economic stage more severely 
using Cases E to H.
Cases E to H:
In these cases, I use each ‘amount’ of net investment, saving, and consumption, 2005–2011.　
2 5 4 5 0 2 2 0 0 8. . . . .= × + ×
Ω Ω Ω= +( / ) ( / )Y Y Y YG G PRI PRI
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21) The process of calculation for the government sector: government returns/rents PG are equal to its 
saving SG, where  .　And, its NDI is the sum of SG and CG.　Thus, the relative 
share of government returns is obtained:   .　Then, using   ,
government capital stock and accordingly, its capital-output ratio WG is obtained.　The above 
results are tested by inserting each value into  .
S S I IG G G G= − +( )
αG G GY= Π / k r wG G G= −( /( )) /( / )α α1
Ω Ω Ω= +( / ) ( / )Y Y Y YG G PRI PRI
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And, I use each rate of increase in net investment, saving, and consumption.　The purpose of 
these cases is to mitigate the damages caused by sudden decreases in net investment.　Invest-
ment enhances the rate of technological progress both at the current situation and at 
convergence.　The decrease in growth rates is indispensable in any economy when the econ-
omy enters into a developed country.　Assume that 30% per annum increase in net investment 
wil continue for the next several years.　This wil shockingly bring about a certain decrease in 
technological progress.　It is indispensable for an economy to shift total investment from quan-
titative to qualitative investment and this requires a low rate of increase in investment.　It is 
impossible for China to continue to increase investment significantly and at the same time main-
tain a corresponding high technological progress (see Figure 2).　Let me briefly describe each 
case and conclusive suggestions among four cases:
In these cases, diferently from the above Cases A to D, the ratio of qualitative investment 
to quantitative investment at convergence, B* (or beta* = 1 / (1 + B*)), is derived as the results 
of per annum increase in net investment, saving and consumption.　In these cases, I adjust the 
rate of increase in each net investment, saving, and consumption so that the capital-output ratio 
wil be within a certain limit or B* wil be competitive under global competition.
Case E shows an extreme of “the rate of increase in each investment and saving is zero” 
under “the rate of increase in consumption is 10%.” As a result, in 2011, the value of B* is 
0.3103, yet the capital-output ratio is 2.7265.　For information, the value of B* is 0.2613 in the 
US 2005 and is 0.1807 in Japan 2005.
Case F results in BOP/NDI = 10.93% in 2011, by increasing net investment, saving, and 
consumption each by 5%, 8.8%, and 10% per annum.　As a result, B* is maintained at a hope-
ful (unexpected) level: from 0.3577 to 0.3019 in 2011.　The growth rates at the current situa-
tion and at convergence are fairly good.　A reason is that I controled Case F so that the capital-
output ratio wil stay below 2.6 for the three years 2009 to 2011.　This implies that the capital-
output ratio is a key to soft landing or sustainable growth.　The years for convergence turn to 
20.27 years in 2011 from 14.89 years in 2005.　The capital-output ratio is 2.5535 in 2011.
Case G results in BOP/NDI = 0.71% in 2011, by increasing net investment, saving, and 
consumption each by 10%, 7.5%, and 10% per annum.　As a result, B* aggravates gradualy: 
from 0.3577 in 2005 to 0.2793 in 2011.　The growth rates at the current situation and at con-
vergence are fairly good.　The years for convergence turn to 15.45 in 2011.　The capital-
output ratio is 2.8667 in 2011.　This is because I did not intentionaly control the capital-output 
ratio.
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Case H shockingly results in BOP/NDI = –12.60% in 2011, by increasing net investment, 
saving, and consumption each by 15%, 7.5%, and 1.5% per annum.　As a result, B* aggravates 
similarly to Case G: from 0.3577 to 0.2714 in 2011.　The growth rates at the current situation 
and at convergence are fairly good due to high investment.　The years for convergence turn to 
be 11 years in 2011 under the control of the capital-output ratio = 2.5 between 2008 and 2011.　
Nevertheless, during the coresponding years, 2008–2011, BOP/NDI is –1.81, –4.96, –8.55, and 
–12.60.　These results come simply from the diference of the increases in saving and net 
investment.
I wil now review the above cases by focusing on the relationship between the capital-
output ratio of the government sector and that of the private sector.
5. In Case E, the NDI share of the government sector decreases to 17.42% in 2011.　This is 
moderate.　Also, the value of B* is 31.03%.　The capital-output ratio of the government 
sector is too highly, i.e., 6.735, whose infrastructures may not be justified.
6. In Case F, the NDI share of the government sector is 23.64% in 2011.　This is a litle high.　
Nevertheless, the capital-output ratio of the whole economy is 2.5535 and that of the gov-
ernment sector is 4.3411 in 2011.　This case is robust and recommendable.
7. Case G, was set to know key ratios when saving or returns at the government sector was 
exhausted.　The NDI share of the government sector is 23.21% in 2011 similarly to Case 
F.　This case indicates that an upper limit of the rate of increase in government investment 
is 15% when government saving (which is equal to returns) is close to zero.　The capital-
output ratio of the private sector is 3.7319, which is out of global competition while that of 
the government sector is 0.0034, which is too unrealistic.　If government saving is close 
to zero, government investment must be restricted severely.　Japan has had the situation 
of SG < 0 after the 1990s.　Besides, Japan has had no guideline to setle the capital-output 
ratio at the whole economy: i.e., without an upper limit of W = 2.5 to the weighted average 
of the two sectors, fiscal policy has lost face.
8. In Case H, the NDI share of the government sector is too high and is 38.85% in 2011.　
This comes from an extremely high rate of increase in government investment: i.e., 29.8% 
per annum.　The capital-output ratio of the whole economy is 2.5 after 2008 by inten-
tional control.　As a result, the capital-output ratio of the private sector is 2.0, which is 
competitive.　Nevertheless, the BOP shows unexpected minus values after 2008 (e.g., 
–12.60% in 2011).　This case happens even if B* is 0.2714% in 2011.　I suggest that 
China needs B* at least the level of 30% for several years after 2005 if China needs huge 
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infrastructures.
9. In my data-set of China 1980–2005 (see Tables A-3 and A-4 in Appendix), the capital-
output ratio of the government sector, WG, and that of the private sector, WPRI, changes 
adversely and overridingly for the long periods.　This suggests that the balance between 
WG and WPRI is more important than the capital-output ratio of the whole economy or that 
the ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investment of the government sector can-
not be far lower than that of the private sector since the later is influenced by the former 
strongly more than expected.
I interpret conclusively the above results in eight cases as folow:
1. Consumption does not influence technology directly.　Consumption, however, is inevita-
ble to maintain a sound level of BOP = S – I.　Nevertheless, saving level depends mostly 
on households, which is not controlable except for the use of tax system.　And, any devel-
oped stage of economy requires consumption-oriented.　If growth is low and steady, 
income difference among people wil not enlarge.　To income inequality, the relative 
share of returns/capital, alpha, is a good indicator: A short-run increase in alpha acceler-
ates income inequality and does not stabilize economic growth.　The value of (rho/r) in 
the labor function of consumption must be carefuly inspected.
2. BOP/NDI is constant if each amount of net investment and saving moves proportionaly 
regardless of whether each level is extremely high or low.　This is a fundamental point: 
for example, the EU rule of 3% to GDP should be evaluated with the level of investment 
(as shown in Balassone Fabrizio, and Daniele Franco, 2000) since the growth rate difers 
by the ratio of investment to output.　In this respect, there is much room for useful 
policies.　If consumption and saving move proportionaly, the exchange rate may slightly 
reflect this movement.
3. Technology is involved in investment, where about 20–30% of net investment to total net 
investment (i.e., 1-beta* = 0.2 to 0.25, or B* = 0.25 to 0.3333) belongs to qualitative invest-
ment in the case of developed countries.　In this sense, the BOP is implicitly related to 
technology.　And similarly, budget deficit is implicitly related to technology.　It is impor-
tant for the central government to compare beta* at the government sector with beta* at the 
private sector or to inspect terrible imbalance between the two values as seen after the 
1990s in Japan.
4. Continuous high level of net investment gradualy results in a higher capital-output ratio.　
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Here, “a higher” capital-output ratio must be within a sound limit.　The capital-output 
ratio approaches a sound limit when the capital-output ratio of the private sector is close to 
2.0 and the capital-output ratio of the whole economy is close to 2.5.　The capital-output 
ratio does not increase so smoothly but, once smoothly increasing, it always rises uncon-
trolably and as a result, sustainable growth wil not realize.　This implies that a sudden 
shock and its taking-time recovery are always inevitable in an economy.22)
5. The capital-output ratio sensitively influences the level of technology.　Even if technology 
is robust in the private sector under an assumption that the government sector is neutral, 
technology does not proportionaly promote the rate of technological progress when the 
capital-output ratio is more than 2.0–2.5.　W = 2.5 of the whole economy as the weighted 
average of the government and private sectors is persuasive in that (1) the capital-output 
ratio of the private sector must be up to 2.0 under competition and (2) the capital-output 
ratio is involved in   in the real world: e.g., if alpha = 18%, the rate of return is 
7.2% and, if alpha = 10%, the rate of return is 4.0%.　Developed countries need high 
levels of R&D, human capital, education, and doing by doing, much more strongly than 
those of developing countries (see Figure 2).
6. In the economic stage, more technology-oriented is required when an underlining stage 
advances.　In this respect, the ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investment, 
B*, is most vital, and this is mostly involved in the capital-output ratio.　When I set a 
sound limit of the capital-output ratio to the government sector, the value of B* at the 
government sector wil not aggravate so much as the case of Japan after the 1990s.
7. In the above eight cases, the years for convergence of China are stil very fast and robust 
compared with other countries.　This is partly because a high rate of technological pro-
gress is highly in proportion to the ratio of net investment to NDI, i:  .　
Accordingly, if net investment decreases to e.g., one-third of the curent level, the years for 
convergence wil be three times longer.　For comparison, see Figure 9 that shows the 
long trends of the years for convergence of the US and Japan, 1960–2005.
8. The above interpretation basicaly focuses on the whole economy, refering to the relation-
α = ⋅Ω r
g iA
* *( )= −1 β
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22) For example, the US increased the capital-output ratio gradualy and its peak was 2.4474 in 1983 
after it hit 2.0076 in 1976.　However, it has stayed at the level of 2.3: 2.1674 in 2003 ands 2.0620 
in 2005.　Exceptionaly, the capital-output ratio of Japan is 3.7060 in 2003 and 3.6655 in 2005 
after it hit 2.0710 in 1982.　The current result comes from continuous huge capital investment of 
the government sector.　The high level of the capital-output ratio weakens the base of economic 
growth by 1 to 1.5% per annum until budget deficit reduces to within a sound level.
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ship of the capital-output ratio between the government and private sectors.　The interpre-
tation wil be further deepened by taking into consideration the combinations of diferent 
region-groups.　This wil constitute separate case studies.　If thirty one regions in China 
are divided into several groups, where fundamental data by region are reliable, I am able to 
more robustly propose the framework of the whole economy, applying the same methodol-
ogy to these cases.　A few combinations of region-groups wil maintain the whole 
economy more robustly, where the above value of BOP/NDI at the whole economy wil 
supposedly be replaced by that by region-group.　In this case, the role of the government 
sector wil be more actively clarified.
4.4 Towards the neutrality of financial assets
This paper concentrates on the analysis the real assets or the data of national accounts.　
This section wil just touch a version towards financial assets.　The balance of payment con-
nects real assets with financial assets.　However, interest rate, the income velocity of money 
and quasi-money, CPI, and accordingly, related ratios between real and financial assets influ-
ence on real assets significantly.　This is because financial assets have their own self increase 
function.　Real assets, of course, produce original/theoretical returns and the theoretical rate of 
return.　In the world economy, the theoretical rate of return must present a fundamental base 
for the relationships between real and financial assets.　I cal this base the neutrality of finan-
cial assets.　This neutrality is justified by the fact that the real assets work most efectively for 
a stable growth with sound inequality by year in the long periods.　This neutrality is set perfect 
when the inflation rate is zero.　For example, if the theoretical ratio of the rate of return to the 
central bank interest rate, r/rCB, equals 1.0, there is no inflation, assuming that the government 
budget is neutral to the theoretical rate of return of the total economy (or, government saving = 
government return = 0).　To supplement this r/rCB, there needed are the valuation ratio, theoreti-
cal assets-deflation, the theoretical cost of capital, the velocity of money and quasi-money (as 
indicated in IFSY, IMF), and the actual and theoretical rates of inflation.
Figure 10 shows some of the above supplementary ratios in China, the US, and India.　In 
Japan, the value of r/rCB is exceptionaly much higher than that in other developed countries for 
the last ten years.　This policy is only alowed in short periods.　This policy presents unfair 
chances for financial assets to increase self-increasing returns in the global economy.　This 
policy also damages Japan itself since national economy appears to be good due to unfair 
exchange rate and accordingly exports on the surface at the sacrifice of low interest paid to 
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Note: The rate of inflation is shown by gy < gw. The rate of change in CPI is gCPI.　The central bank 
interest rate is rCB. gy – gw, the rate of return, and the cost of capital are theoretical in my model.
Figure 10　The rate of inflation gy – gw, gCPI, and the rate of return and the cost of capital each to rCB 
that indicate the neutrality of financial assets: China, the US, and India
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national debts.　Any policy of a country is related to many counties in the global economy.
The values of r/rCB in China, the US, and India are comparatively moderate, faling into the 
range of 1.0 to 2.0 (for comparison with other ratios, Figure 10 used 0.1r instead of r).　The 
theoretical cost of capital has been extremely minus in China due to a considerably high rate of 
output by year.　China’s case is typical yet recently this ratio becomes moderate.　The rate of 
theoretical inflation in real assets is shown by gy – gw: if gy > gw it shows deflation and if gy < gw 
it shows inflation.　The actual rate of inflation, however, is determined by the relationship 
among the BOP, interest rate, and exchange rate, which is simultaneously related to the income 
velocity of money and quasi-money.　Without flexible policies to jointly adjust the above 
ratios, China wil fal into inflation even if budget deficit is within a control.　And more impor-
tantly, capital in real assets has increased so rapidly that the economic stage is entering into a 
developed country, which implies that China needs more human capital and technological 
progress towards environmental health: a steady improvement of the relationship between the 
capital-output ratio and the ratio of qualitative to quantitative investment is today’s urgent 
mater much more than quantitative growth.
5.　CONCLUSIONS
Any country has met the economic stages.　Poor countries cannot usualy conquer the dif-
ficulties to jump up into developing countries.　Developing countries cannot always enter into 
developed countries.　These are general results in the world economy.　In particular, why do 
developed countries, without exception, sufer from dificulties to maintain sustainable growth 
and what prevents these countries from sustainable growth?　China is one of rare cases in the 
economic stage and has entering into a developed country.　What are fundamental reasons for 
China to get to the current situation?　Can China realy continue to enjoy the current situation 
after 2005?　This paper approached these questions boldly from the viewpoint of the relation-
ship between the ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investment, B*, and the capital-
output ratio.　Answers to the above questions in my research is mostly based on Kamiryo 
(2006b, 2007e) that presented an endogenous growth model, methods to estimate capital and 
returns, and data-sets 1995–2004 at the macro-level.　My research in this paper also took into 
consideration new data-sets 1960–2005 that measured the years for convergence by country in 
Kamiryo (2007e, 2008a).　I stress, as my contribution in this paper, that the above approach 
clarified some of growth problems inherent in developed countries.　And, China may be able 
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to conquer these problems by taking urgent actions against those serious results of eight cases 
2005–2011 as discussed at the end of Session 4.　Otherwise, worldwide depression wil soon 
be inevitable.　Already the US and Japan have lost each past robust base for sustainable growth.　
China has realized this fact and China must contribute to sustainable growth in the global 
economy.
I wil briefly summarize the transition in China from a poor to a developed stage in eco-
nomic growth.　First, investment must be maintained steadily and highly in the process until 
just before entering a developed stage.　When investment is long supported by technological 
progress led through R&D, human capital, education, and learning by doing, a country wil 
reach a developed stage.　China is a memorial case.
China got over the entrance of the developed stage in 2002, as proved by the level of the 
capital-output ratio which I estimated consistently using my model and methods at the macro-
level.　This ratio is 1.0077 in 1986, 1.5667 in 1998, 2.0523 in 2002, and now 2.1630 in 2005.　
Each corresponding ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investment at convergence, 
B*, is 0.8362, 0.5224, 0.4077, and now 0.3577 in 2005.　Developed countries have 20% to 
30% levels of B*, according to my data-sets 1995–2004 and 1960–2005.　I stress: China right 
now must cope with sustainable growth, facing at an upper limit of the capital-output ratio as 
most developed countries have sufered from a tough limit of the capital-output ratio.　The 
higher the ratio of net investment to NDI the higher the rate of technological progress, yet this 
is justified only when the capital-output ratio is below 2.0.
Eight cases (Cases A to H) in Section 4 clarified the clue of the above determinants.　It is 
more dificult for developed countries to maintain a constant capital-output ratio and improve 
technology.　To overcome this dificulty, China must reduce the current level of investment 
and instead maintain the level of B* at the level of 30% as much as possible.　And, this is only 
possible by controling the capital-output ratio of the whole economy, in corporation of a 
balanced relationship between the capital-output ratio at the government sector and that at the 
private sector.
This wil be more reliable (with mitigating income-inequality) only if thirty-one regions 
are divided into several region-groups.　The BOP, budget deficit, the diference in saving and 
net investment rates of each region-group wil be treated as if each item of each region-group is 
that of a diferent country, where model, methods, and data in this paper are similarly applied to 
each region-group.　I wil discuss this procedure in the future when several fundamental values 
are available by region-group.
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Appendix The relationship among TFP, the capital-output ratio, 
and beta or B
A key word to sustainable growth is the capital-output ratio in this paper.　The capital-out-
put ratio is, however, delicately related various levels of technology at the flow and stock levels. 
In this Appendix, I wil setle in good order four equations in Articles 1 to 4 that clarify the rela-
tionship among total factor productivity (TFP), the capital-output ratio, and the ratio of qualita-
tive investment to quantitative investment at both flow and stock levels.
At the flow level starting with  :
Total factor productivity (TFP) and the ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative 
investment at the flow level  are independently measured.　Thus, the relation-
ship between TFP and  cannot be obtained in the same Cobb-Douglas production 
function.　In this connection, the literature (such as Jorgenson and Griliches (1967, p. 249) al 
indicates that TFP is vague as a residual and even meaningless.　I break this rule in this 
Appendix.　First, I wil explain Article 1 at the flow level.
Article 1:  or :
  is derived from the Cobb-Douglas production function.　TFP(t) is 
obtained using   and   in the transitional path.　However, the 
relationship between  and TFP(t) cannot be specified.
 , where  or .
This is the Cobb-Douglas production function under CRS.　The transitional path starts with 
DRC and reaches CRC under CRS.
My model first endogenously measures Cobb-Douglas production function by using equa-
tions at convergence and related equations for beta, beta* W*, and delta:
Assuming that  is the capital-output ratio at convergence, W*,
  and .
23)
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23) The equations start with the current/initial value of the capital-output ratio.　However, these equa-
tions also hold when an arbitrary value of the capital-output ratio is given, where I express W and 
beta by erasing the subscript of the curent 0.
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 .
Or, set  and , then,
 .
The equations are wholy integrated in Kamiryo (2007b).　In short, the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion function cannot specify the relationship between TFP and the ratio of qualitative invest-
ment to quantitative investment at the flow level.　Yet, it presents a base for the folowing 
steps at the stock level.
By combining  (as an assumption) with  
of the Cobb-Douglas production function,   is derived.　Then, 
  at convergence holds.　Therefore, if   is obtained, as an assump-
tion24), where ,
  is derived, using the above .
Note that in the Cobb-Douglas production function and  
exist.
At the stock level resulting in various production functions:
Total factor productivity (TFP) is measured by my endogenous growth model and its resid-
ual reduces to the ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative investment with a power, 
depending on each definition of the residual.　Each residual is no more meaningless.　The 
residual shows an essence of technology.　Here I wil show Articles 2, 3, and 4 at the stock 
level.　The relationship between TFP and the ratio of qualitative investment to quantitative 
investment at the stock level (BTFP) is dependently measured in corporation with the Cobb-Doug-
las production function.
Article 2　FINAL residual of TFP:
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24) The reason is this: in recursive programming where the transitional path by year is shown, 
  does not hold.　When the curent situation is compared with the situation at conver-
gence (without using the transitional path),  holds if I assume that the curent capital-
output ratio equals the capital-output ratio at convergence.
1 0
1
0= ⋅
−B*( ) *δ Ω
1 0
1
0= ⋅
−B*( ) *δ Ω
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 , where
 , where .
This is an Ak model over years in the transitional path, which corresponds with that of 
Hussein Khaled and Anthony P.　Thirlwal (2000) discusses.
Note that  and accordingly,
 .25)
This is a final Ak model under CRS in my approach.　I prefer Article 1 at the flow level to the 
folowing Articles 3 and 4 at the stock level.　This is because the results of Article 1 are 
directly connected with those of the equations at the flow level above.　As a result,
 
 using  and
 .
Thus,  or
  holds.
Note that  as an assumption is used for delta and does not work
consistently within the Cobb-Douglas production function.
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25) This form is extremely specified so that   holds always 
unexceptionaly.　The method for measuring delta is independent of those equations to obtain beta 
and beta*.　The value of delta exists to solve the relationship between the flow level of investment 
and the stock level of TFP, where I assume that  .　At the same time, delta 
exists to neutralize DRC inherent in the Cobb-Douglas production function under CRS and to real-
ize CRC at convergence in the transitional path.
1 0. ( ) ( )( ) ( )= ⋅B t tTFP FINAL TFP FINALΩ
TFP t B t k t t( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )= ⋅ −1 δ
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 , where
 .
Note that  and accordingly,
 .
This is an Ak model only at convergence.
Article 4 under IRS:
  or , where
  holds.　Thus, .
Note that  and accordingly,
 .
The above (Article 4) shows that the Cobb-Douglas production function shifts to an IRS produc-
tion function.　The above three production functions in Eqs.(Articles 2, 3, and 4) are caled 
each a bypath production function that exists in paralel to the Cobb-Douglas production 
function.　The capital-output ratio of the bypass production function difers from that of the 
coresponding Cobb-Douglas production function.
The form of capital-output ratio does not include labor yet, Y = NDI includes labor 
and TFP.　As a result, the capital-output ratio is a unique connector between technology and 
capital.　Conclusively, I atach importance to the TFP as a final residual,  , 
in the above Article 2, where  .　The measurement of 
  expresses an essence of residual technology which the literature has not 
found hitherto.
Figure 1　The elasticity of the ratio of qualitative to quantitative investment at convergence, B0
*, 
with respect to the ratio of net investment to output, i; with its base
Figure 2　The elasticity of the ratio of qualitative to quantitative investment, B0
*, with respect to the 
capital-output ratio, W*; with its base at convergence
Figure 3　The growth rates, the ratios of qualitative to quantitative investment, and the capital-
output ratios: in the transitional path, China 2005
Figure 4　The growth rates, the ratios of qualitative to quantitative investment, and the capital-
output ratios: in the transitional path, the US 2005
Figure 5　The function of consumption in China 1980–2005
Figure 6　BOP, budget deficit, saving/NDI, per capita NDI, and the wage rate: China 1980–2005
Figure 7　Net investment/NDI, alpha, the capital-output ratio, the ratio of qualitative investment to 
quantitative investment at convergence, B*, and the rates of tech. progress at current and at 
convergence: China, 1980–2005
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Figure 8　Cases C and D in planned transition in China 2005 to 2011
Figure 9　The years for convergence: China, the US, and Japan
Figure 10　The rate of inflation gy – gw, gCPI, and the rate of return and the cost of capital each to rCB 
that indicate the neutrality of financial assets: China, the US, and India
Table 1　Case A: A soft landing when a rate of investment gradualy decreases
Table 2　Case B: A soft landing when a rate of investment is highly planned
Table 3　Case C: A soft landing when the capital-output ratio is severely maintained
Table 4　Case D: A soft landing when the rate of consumption is highly maintained
Table 5　Case E: A soft landing by reducing net investment by 5% each year
Table 6　Case F: A soft landing by increasing net investment by 5% each year
Table 7　Case G: A soft landing by increasing net investment by 10% each year
Table 8　Case H: A soft landing by increasing net investment by 11.25% (as the above limit) each 
year
Table A-1　Simulation 1: Basic relationships with delta and the years for convergence by the change 
in n
Table A-2　Simulation 2: Basic relationships with TFP and B* TFP(FINAL) by the change in n
Table A-3　Data-set of China, 1980–2005 (1)
Table A-4　Data-set of China, 1980–2005 (2)
Table A-5　Summary of notation used in the data-set
Figure A-1　Framework of KEWT in detail: its brief flowchart and feedback for decision-making, 
comparing with the literature
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Table 3　Case C: A soft landing when the capital-output ratio is severely maintained
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Table 5　Case E: A soft landing by reducing net investment by 5% each year
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Table 6　Case F: A soft landing by increasing net investment by 5% each year
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Table 7　Case G: A soft landing by increasing net investment by 10% each year
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Table 8　Case H: A soft landing by increasing net investment by 11.25% (as the above limit) each 
year
Hideyuki Kamiryo
―　　―74
Table A-1 Simulation 1: Basic relationships with delta and the years for convergence by the change 
in n
Note: Case 4 is common to any country.　Case 5 assumes B* is 0.3 which is close to the 
world average.
 Case 6 assumes that the capital-output ratio is 4.0 as an upper limit in 
advanced/developing countries.
Source: Kamiryo (2007b)
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Table A-2　Simulation 2: Basic relationships with TFP and B* TFP(FINAL) by the change in n
Note: Case 4 is common to any country.　Case 5 assumes B* is 0.3 which is close to world 
average.
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Table A-3　Data-set of China, 1980–2005 (1)
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Table A-4　Data-set of China, 1980–2005 (2)
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Table A-5　Summary of notation used in the data-set
Source: Kamiryo (2006d).
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Figure A-1 Framework of KEWT in detail: its brief flowchart and feedback for 
decision-making, comparing with the literature
Source: Kamiryo (2008b).
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